This paper investigates the effect of state contract enforcement on international trade. Following Rose (2004a), I estimate a gravity model of bilateral trade using panel data that covers 157 countries over the last 50 years. I find that state enforcement increases trade between nations-but less impressively than its status as essential for flourishing trade suggests. My analysis provides the first direct evidence of state enforcement's impact on trade in general and international trade in particular. (JEL Codes: K33, F10) 
Introduction
Is state-provided contract enforcement important for trade? Most economists certainly think so. Many would go as far as to say that a high volume of growing trade requires state enforcement. The rationale underlying this conventional wisdom is highly sensible: Formal enforcement pulls individuals out of anarchy and in doing so gives anonymous and distantly located strangers security to contract major transactions without fear of fraud. 1 The importance of state enforcement seems so sensible as to nearly place it beyond the realm of propositions deserving empirical investigation. This likely explains why no one has econometrically examined the e¤ect of state-provided contract enforcement on trade. But do we really know that state enforcement is so important for trade?
The international arena provides an excellent ground to test this claim. With the exception of a multinational treaty known as the New York Convention, international commerce is conducted in the absence of formal contract enforcement. Private international arbitration associations govern commercial disputes between international traders. 2 No supranational authority exists for this purpose. 3 In fact, there is not even a formal, universal body of international commercial law on the basis of which such an authority could adjudicate transnational commercial agreements if one existed (see for instance, Oye 1986: 1; Plantey 1993: 69).
W O R K I N G P A P E R
Despite the lack of formal global governance, international trade is large and growing rapidly. Today it accounts for some 25 percent of global economic activity. and Mangles 1999 and Casella 1996). As one leading international practitioner put it: "in today's world the dispute resolution mechanism will invariably be arbitration" (Aksen 1990: 287) .
International traders use arbitration to settle disputes for several reasons. First, they are interested in avoiding the home court of the other party. Parties fear being subjected to unknown laws, having a decision rendered in an unknown language via unknown procedure, being subjected to law or procedure they disagree with or feel is inappropriate for their case, 6 or they fear that a state court will favor their adversary if he is a citizen of that nation. Second, there is an important question as to which state court, if either, has jurisdiction in the matter of a dispute. Competing claims to jurisdiction are problematic. 7 But equally troublesome is the unwillingness of either state court to decide the dispute because neither feels that it is equipped to
adjudicate an international matter. Third, the decisions of state courts regarding matters of international commerce are di¢ cult to enforce (Dezalay and Garth 1996: 6). In many cases state courts do not recognize foreign judgments. Even when they do, it is di¢ cult to seize the assets of the loser if he is not from the country where the court's decision is made. 8 International arbitration overcomes these problems by "delocalizing" 9 dispute resolution. Under arbitration, parties may choose with respect to the variables concerning adjudication of their dispute. These variables include the site of dispute resolution and the law that will govern their dispute, which ranges from any national law to the evolved customs called the lex mercatoria (law merchant) 10 that through common practice and usage have come to govern international commerce. 11 Parties may also select the number of arbitrators who will decide their dispute, the identity of these arbitrators or the process by which they are appointed. If parties cannot agree to one or more of these variables they may stipulate that a neutral third party-the arbitrators of their case, for instance-decide these items for them.
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There are hundreds of international arbitration forums globally (Graving 1989: 328 Table A3 provides descriptive statistics. My variables of interest are not highly correlated with the standard gravity variables or the factors I condition them on so multicollinearity is not a concern.
I estimate the augmented gravity equation:
where X ijt is the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time 
The NYC and Trade at a Glance
A casual look at the data suggests that state enforcement has had a negligible impact on trade. To put this in perspective, the NYC has roughly the same impact on trade as sharing a common language. Compare the size of this e¤ect with the e¤ect of membership in a regional trade agreement which is 163 percent and far from the largest coe¢ cient in 
Benchmark Results

Sensitivity Analysis
Countries that are in di¤erent stages of development may experience di¤erential bene…ts from having state enforcement for international commercial contracts. For instance, contractual violations might be less frequent in exchange relationships involving individuals from more developed countries where institutions are of better quality and people may exhibit a higher level of commercial honesty. In this case, we should expect the bene…t of formally-provided contract enforcement to be greater in poorer countries. On the other hand, richer countries may bene…t more from the NYC since domestic courts, which ultimately do the enforcing under the NYC, tend to be higher quality in these places. To determine if there are development-dependent e¤ects of state enforcement, I break the sample into four income groupings.
The results of these regressions, presented in Table 3 , support the latter intuition.
Countries in the top half of the sample income distribution experience slightly more gains from state enforcement than the sample as a whole, while countries in the poorer half of the sample do considerably worse than the sample as a whole. Importantly, cutting the sample by income class this way still yields little evidence that state enforcement appreciably increases trade for countries at any level of development.
In the same Table 2 is absent here.
Interacting the NYC variables with (log) real GDP per capita, common lan- The coe¢ cients on these variables are positive, signi…cant, and moderately sized.
The dynamic analysis suggests that there may be a delayed e¤ect of joining the NYC on trade. In the next column I use a Prais-Winsten estimator to check if this is the result of signi…cant serial correlation, which it largely is. Consistent with my benchmark …ndings, the Prais-Winsten estimates in columns 2 and 3 indicate a small, positive impact of state enforcement on trade, with and without accounting for membership lags. As a robustness check, in columns 4-6 I also use a country-pair random e¤ects estimator, which delivers slightly larger, but consistent …ndings both when membership lags are included and when they are not. As one …nal robustness test on the potential for a delayed e¤ect of state enforcement, the last column of Table   4 performs an OLS estimate with year e¤ects including a lagged dependent variable.
I again …nd similar results. Dynamic considerations do not seem to provide evidence that state enforcement has substantially increased trade. Table 7 contains the results of
Most of the e¤ects in Table 7 Table 8 presents the results of these regressions. Column 1 contains the default speci…cation, which again includes year e¤ects, and column 2 adds country …xed e¤ects. The results for all the variables, including state enforcement, are nearly identical to those in Table 2 . In the default speci…cation, state enforcement, measured as membership in any treaty with the end of providing formal enforcement for international arbitral awards, is economically small and negative. In the speci…cation that includes country …xed e¤ects, membership in any such treaty increases trade A …nal concern, which has been raised in the literature discussing the gravity model, is that trade cannot be negative. To see if this is in ‡uencing my results, I use a Tobit estimator, replacing the smallest 5 percent of the sample trade observations with zero. This robustness check does nothing to improve the e¤ect of state enforcement.
When Tobit is used, the coe¢ cients of interest fall substantially. 21 Modifying the threshold below which sample trade observations are replaced with zero delivers the same result.
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